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STANDING FOR ENVIRONMENTALISTS:
SIERRA CLUB v. MORTON
Sierra Club v. Morton" is the first Supreme Court decision to
squarely decide the issue of whether public conservation groups
alleging only a generally-shared public injury have standing to initiate
judicial review.2 The issue arose as a result of a United States Forest
Service decision, in 1965, to develop the Mineral King Valley game
refuge located in the California Sierra Nevadas. The original Forest
Service Prospectus3 called for a three million dollar, 80-acre develop-
ment. The plan included ski lifts, tramways, parking, hotel accom-
modations and necessary sanitation, supply and maintenance facil-
ities.4 Despite Sierra Club's (Club) persistent efforts to challenge the
original decision to develop the valley, the Forest Service accepted
Walt Disney Enterprises' vastly expanded plan.5 There had been no
public notice or hearing.6 In addition to the main development, an
improved road and high voltage power line which would traverse nine
miles of the Sequoia National Forest were planned7 Before the road
construction contract could be awarded, however, the Club sought
and obtained a preliminary injunctions on the grounds that the Forest
and Park Services, and the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior
had exceeded their respective statutory authority, acted in violation of
1. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
2. Id. See also 3 K. DAvis, ADMrNIsTRATIvE LAw TREATIsE § 22.07 (1958).
3. 403 U.S. at 729. The terms of the Prospectus which described the project
and invited bids are set out in Browning, Mickey Mouse in the Mountains, H.A-
PERS MAGAZINE, Mar. 1972, at 68.
4. Browning, supra note 3.
5. The Disney development proposal included 22 to 27 ski lifts, a 3,600 car
garage, a 1,030 room hotel with lodging for 3,310 people, restaurants, boutiques,
a theater, equestrian and convention centers, indoor and outdoor pools, a skating
rink, hospital, heliport and excursion trains from the garage to the lodge. It is
estimated that 14,000 people will visit the area daily. In addition to the original
80-acre site, the Forest Service issued a year-to-year lease on 300 more acres. Id.
6. 405 U.S. at 730 n.2. See 36 C.F.R. § 211 (1972); 43 C.F.R. § 4 (1972).
Both the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior have regulations re-
quiring public hearings on proposed projects. Id.
7. 405 U.S. at 729, 758.
8. Sierra Club v. Hickel, Civil No. 51464 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 4, 1969).
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national park regulations and failed to hold proper public hearings.0
On appeal, defendant agency successfully challenged the Club's
standing to sue. The complaint did not assert that the Club's prop-
erty, organization or its individual members would be harmed by the
decision.'0 Hence, the injunction was vacated due to the Club's fail-
ure to show either irreparable injury or a likelihood of success on the
merits.'1
The court of appeals treated the Club's suit as an attempt to judi-
dally overrule a legislative decision and concluded:
We do not believe such dub concern without a showing of more
direct interest can constitute standing in the legal sense sufficient
to challenge the exercise of responsibilities on behalf of all the
citizens by two cabinet level officials of the government acting
under Congressional and Constitutional authority.12
Apparently this language caused the Club to refrain from alleging
an individualized injury on appeal. The Club's reply brief argued
that the circuit court's reasoning left the Club with no chance of suc-
cess.' 3 The Club could have asserted individualized injury to itself
or its members, but they would have been faced with the answer that
"assertion of a private, unique injury ... does not warrant an injunc-
tion adverse to a competing public interest."14 The result would
have been a bar to injunctive relief. Alternatively, they could have
alleged prospective harm to the general public interest, but the result
would have been a loss of standing for failure to assert a private,
unique injury.'5 In denying that no remedy existed, the Supreme
Court, in a four to three decision, affirmed the dismissal without
prejudice to enable the Club to include an allegation of individual-
ized injury in its complaint.16
9. Id. at - In addition to violations of public hearing requirements, the
Sierra Club alleged that the Forest Service had granted more acreage to the proj-
ect than allowed by 16 U.S.C. § 497 (1970), and that the road and power line
grants violated 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 41, 43 (1970).
10. Sierra Club v. -lickel, 433 F.2d 24, 30 (9th Cir. 1970).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 405 U.S. at 740 n.15.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 735-36 n.8.
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The majority rationale was based on two theories. First, a party
initiating judicial review of agency action may represent the public
only if it first has standing in its own right because either its cor-
porate self or aggregate membership has suffered "injury in fact."'17
Thus, although the Court did not question the allegations that "the
development would destroy . . . the scenery, natural and historic
objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoyment of
the park for future generations," it held that "the party seeking re-
view must be himself among the injured."' S Secondly, the Court
believed that without a requirement of individualized injury, there
would be no way to exclude "organizations or individuals who seek
to do no more than vindicate their own value preferences through
the judicial process." 19
Justices Douglas, Blackmun and Brennan dissented. Justice Douglas
argued for adoption of a rule that would allow standing to the nat-
ural resources themselves-to be represented by those willing to pro-
tect the endangered resource.20 Douglas distinguished responsible
environmentalists from persons who are merely caught up in the news
and flock to defend the latest issue.21 Justice Blackmun believed the
merits of the case too important to be denied consideration by inflex-
ible rules and proposed alternative solutions. He argued that the
Sierra Club either be allowed to amend its complaint on appeal or be
afforded standing under a liberalized rule that would include groups
or persons with long-standing sincerity and dedication to improving
environmental quality.22 Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Black-
mun's second alternative.23
Standing to sue is basically a control technique designed to insure
that the parties seeking access to the courts will truly represent the
legal interests or positions they assert. The belief is that the more
directly threatened a party is, the more diligent he will be in present-
17. Id. at 734-35.
18. Id. at 735.
19. Id. at 740.
20. Id. at 741. See also Stone, Should Trees Have Standing, Toward Legal
Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 450 (1972).
21. 405 U.S. at 752.
22. Id. at 757-58.
23. Id. at 755.
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ing the issues.24 This in turn sharpens the focus of the suit. In ad-
ministrative law, the test has crystallized into one of "injury in fact"
or a showing that the plaintiff's interests are or will be directly
threatened by agency action.25 For many years economic injury alone
was recognized as sufficient to confer standing.26 In the 1950's, how-
ever, the Court expanded the scope of protection to include consumers
of regulated products, 2 as well as persons or groups alleging injury to
aesthetic, environmental, scenic and historic values.25 The persistent
question has been whether the requisite directness of injury to those
asserting non-economic values is met by groups alleging only the pub-
lic's interest in environmental preservation. Generally, that question
is answered in the negative, but initiators who can represent the
public interest only after a showing of direct injury are distinguished
from intervenors into an ongoing suit in that the latter are deemed
only to be raising related issues that the court could raise on its own
motion.29
Despite a general trend toward liberalized standing in other cir-
cuits,30 the Ninth Circuit has increasingly refused to grant standing to
public interest groups. The underlying rationale of the requirement
24. See generally THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMiERUCA,
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 599-601 (N. Small & L. Jayson eds. 1964) and
cases collected therein.
25. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Cramp v.
Board of Pub. Educ., 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co.
v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens Comm. v. Volpe, 425 F.2d
97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v.
Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518
(D.C. Cir. 1963); Lee v. CAB, 225 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1955); State v. Penn-
sylvania-New York Cent Transp. Co., 323 F. Supp. 487 (D. Del. 1971); Coali-
tion for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Ill.
1970); Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 314 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.W. Va.
1969), affd, 429 F.2d 423 (1970); American President Lines v. Federal Maritime
Bd., 112 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1953).
26. See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1967); City of Chi-
cago v. Atchison T. & S.F.R. Co., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
27. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
28. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
154 (1970).
29. See K. DAvis, supra note 2.
30. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, U. Cm. L. Rav. 450 (1970).
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seems to be the fear that the courts would be flooded by public inter-
est suits attempting to overturn agency decisions.
In Brooks v. Volpe,3 1 the court, in denying standing to three con-
servation groups32 attempting to initiate a suit to enjoin a highway
project on the border of a campground, said:
The requirement that litigants have standing to sue is not met
by an association, such as [any one of] these, simply because the
organization has as its purpose such laudable goals as preserva-
tion of the scenic, recreational, and wilderness values of
areas .... 33
Perhaps the strongest statement against giving standing to groups
alleging only a publicly shared interest in the outcome is contained in
Alameda Conservation Association v. State of California.-4 In that
case, both individuals and the Alameda Conservation Association
(Alameda) attacked the constitutionality of a California statute under
which a salt company claiming ownership of submerged land in San
Francisco Bay had commenced land filling operations. The com-
plaint alleged irreparable injury and petitioned for injunctive relief.
The individuals alleged they lived near the Bay and that the value of
their homes would be substantially decreased by the flushing and
cooling effect of the Bay on the climate. Alameda merely alleged a
publicly shared interest in preserving the natural characteristics of the
Bay.35 Again the individuals prevailed, but Alameda's complaint was
dismissed by the court with its statement that:
However well intentioned the members may be, they may not by
uniting create for themselves a super-administrative agency or a
parens patriae official status with the capability of over-seeing and
of challenging the action of the appointed and elected officials of
the state government....
Were it otherwise the various clubs, political, economic and
social now or yet to be organized, could wreak havoc with the
administration of government, both federal and state. There are
other forums where their voices and their views may be effectively
31. 329 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
32. Id. at 119. The three clubs were The North Cascades Conservation Council,
The Alpine Lakes Protective Society and The Federation of Western Outdoors
Clubs.
33. Id. at 119-20.
34. 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971).
35. Id.
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presented, but to have standing to submit a "case or controversy"
to a federal court, something more must be shown.80 (Emphasis
added.)
Clearly, Morton is the logical outgrowth of the Brooks and Alameda
reasoning. There is no clear indication, however, that governmental
agency functions will be halted by large numbers of intervention
suits. Generally, the courts have been reluctant to limit standing on
the basis of the "court flooding" argument: first, because the reason
is considered insignificant 'in comparison to the issues involved; 37 and
second, because the agency review statutes severely limit both the
time of filing for review and the number of jurisdictions in which
petitions for review may be filed.88
Moreover, there is an alternative method, long recognized in other
circuits, which allows wide and responsible public participation to-
gether with objective criteria by which frivolous challenges can be
excluded. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Society v. Federal Power
Commission,39 the Society was held to have standing to challenge the
Federal Power Commission's authorization of a federal dam project
which would inundate an area rich in colonial history and scenic
beauty. The basis for standing was that "those who by their activities
and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be
held to be included in the class of 'aggrieved' parties under [the Federal
Power Act]." 40 Similarly, Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair"
held that the League's Illinois chapter had demonstrated requisite
adversity by virtue of its long-standing activity in conservation mat-
ters.42 An Arkansas federal district court case, Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers,43 allowed a New York corporation to join
five local conservation societies in a petition to enjoin an Army Corps
of Engineers' project which allegedly would pollute Ozark waterways.
The court said "There can be no doubt that the corporate plaintiffs
are interested and antagonistic enough to present the issues vigorously
36. Id. at 1090.
37. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
39. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
40. Id. at 616.
41. 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970).
42. Id. at 1317.
43. 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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and with ... concrete adverseness. . . ."4 No individual interest was
asserted. Finally, in Cape May County Chapter, Inc. and Izaak Wal-
ton League of America v. Macchia45 the League was afforded standing
to challenge a dredging permit which allegedly would have allowed
destruction of an unusual marine life community. The basis for
standing was the interest exhibited by the League in the past. 6
The policy reasons behind liberalized standing seem more sound
than the rationale to the contrary as expressed in Morton. First, inter-
vention suits by groups such as the Sierra Club have been recognized
as necessary to implement the purposes of the National Environmental
Policy Act' 7 and its requirement that all agencies take the environ-
mental impact of proposed projects into account before issuance of
permits.3 Second, the criteria of long-standing interest, ability and
willingness to research and finance litigation provide natural require-
ments by which the courts can control access to the review machinery.
Third, a realistic, practical assessment of the limited number of per-
sons or groups who are truly capable of maintaining public interest
suits is presented.49 Finally, contrary to the claim that there would
be a flood of litigation, defendant agencies are free to move for class
action designation of suits under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure"0 to prevent repetitive harassment.
The law seems to be that a conservationist society does not have
standing to initiate judicial review of agency actions unless it al-
leges some individualized injury to its property, activities or members.
Any trend toward a more liberalized standing requirement has been
extinguished, but only by a four to three decision.
44. Id. at 735-36.
45. 329 F. Supp. 504 (D.N.J. 1971).
46. Id. at 511. Four other cases, Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428
F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 328 F. Supp. 332
(D.N.M. 1971); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971); En-
vironmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971),
although frequently cited as standing for the same proposition, are of questionable
authority since plaintiffs in the above-mentioned cases actually alleged individual-
ized injury to their respective members.
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 et seq. (1970). See generally Note, A Preliminary
Assessment of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1973 U"RAN L.
ANN. 209.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970).
49. 313 F. Supp. at 1317.
50. FED. R. Crv. P. 23. See, e.g., In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp.
484 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Dist. Lit. 1968).
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While we increasingly rely on agencies to fill in the complexities of
Congressional policy, public access to the courts is being denied to
those best able to articulate possible shortcomings in agency actions.
Knowledgeable and dedicated groups (whether environmentally-
oriented or not) who are in a better position to analyze these com-
plex agency actions, but are without the requisite directness of injury,
must now either turn to the legislatures or hope the new make-up of
the Supreme Court will result in a reconsideration of the standing
argument. Thus, the decision in Morton extends far beyond the
immediate environmental question.
Alan R. Nettles
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